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ABSTRACT 
The economic principals of today’s internet have facilitated the rapid development of the digital economy. However, content 
providers with business models that are based on Voice over IP, internet-based TV or Software-as-a-Service have higher 
quality requirements than other internet companies. Thus, network operators are discussing the introduction of quality 
differentiated transport classes (QoS). This article uses the methodology of agent-based computational economics (ACE) to 
assess the economics of a QoS interconnection market. Based on real-world market data we choose a representative set of 
networks for simulating the value distribution among different network types in three market phases. Moreover, we analyze 
which network properties correlate with market success. The results suggest that content providers have strong incentives to 
establish direct interconnections with access providers. Thus, transit providers will be bypassed and face falling revenues. 
Access network providers will be able to collect most transport revenues and refinance infrastructure investments.  
Keywords 
Network Operator value creation and distribution, Wholesale Business Models, Inter-Provider QoS, Sending Party Pays, 
agent-based computational economics. 
INTRODUCTION 
The increasing popularity of services such as Internet based TV, Voice over IP, Software-as-a-Service or online gaming 
results in rising infrastructure requirements with respect to network properties like latency, reliability or bandwidth. This 
development constitutes a structural challenge for telecommunications and broadband Internet industries as quality-centric 
data transport has to be negotiated and assured across network boundaries (Inter-Provider QoS) (Briscoe and Rudkin, 2005; 
Constantiou and Courcoubetis, 2001; Hwang and Weiss, 2000; Shenker, Clark, Estrin and Herzog, 1996). In order to enable 
Inter-Provider QoS network operators propose to assign quality parameters to services (QoS) (Gozdecki, Jajszczyk and 
Stankiewicz, 2003; Zarnekow, Brenner and Dous, 2007). However, network operators do not only have to resolve technical 
issues in order to setup Inter-Provider QoS but they are also discussing the introduction of a new QoS specific 
interconnection regime which could fundamentally change value creation and distribution in the Internet interconnection 
market. The aim of this paper is the introduction of an agent-based computational model for the simulation and assessment of 
value distribution in a QoS interconnection market with a QoS specific interconnection regime. 
A quality-centric interconnection regime 
The proposal of a QoS-specific interconnection regime is causing controversial debates among network operators, scientists 
and politicians which are dominated by economic and political interests. Advocates of the traditional interconnection regime 
of the Best-Effort Internet (Bill and Keep) argue that it should be applied to any Internet service (FCC, 2010). In this 
interconnection regime Transit Provider (TP) are paid by enterprise customers (EC) and content providers (CP) for received 
and transmitted data. However, some scientists point out that the introduction of Inter-Provider QoS should go along with the 
introduction of a Sending-(Network)-Party-Pays (SPP) regime (Kruse, 2008; Steingröver, 2008). In the SSP regime payments 
are cascading along the data stream. Inter-Provider QoS has not been implemented on a large scale, yet. Thus, economic 
consequences of competitive strategic behavior under the SSP regime are not sufficiently understood and of interest for 
advocates and opponents (FCC, 2010). We are therefore proposing a model for the assessment of value creation under the 
SSP regime. 
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Related work 
During the last ten years many authors have proposed models for the assessment of value creation processes within the 
Internet. Several authors assess coordination between internet services providers with game theoretic approaches (Cao, Shen, 
Milito and Wirth, 2002;Ma, Chiu, Lui, Misra and Rubenstein, 2007). However, as indicated in (Wulf, Limbach and 
Zarnekow, 2010) these approaches can be too static in order to analyze the dynamics in a QoS interconnection market. Other 
authors have used Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) in order to assess techno-economic issues within the Best-
Effort interconnection market (Chang, Jamin and Willinger, 2006; Dhamdhere and Dovrolis, 2009; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 
2008; Li, Alderson, Willinger and Doyle, 2004). Our paper uses the same quantitative research method but assesses a QoS 
interconnection market which is based on the SSP regime. Previous publications on the SSP regime have been qualitative and 
conceptual in nature (Kruse, 2008; Steingröver, 2008). 
AGENT-BASED SIMULATION MODEL 
ACE is the computational study of economic processes which are modeled as dynamic systems of interacting heterogeneous 
agents (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006). North and Macal (2007) advocate the use of ACE if agents engage in dynamic 
relationships with other agents, structural changes in the macro level are not simulation input but simulation result and the 
decision behavior of agents is mutually dependent. 
Simulation validity and data 
Any model which aims to facilitate the understanding of a real-world economy needs to be validated (LeBaron and 
Tesfatsion, 2008). The validity of ACE models can be proved with empirical data or based on scenarios proposed by experts 
(Moss, 2008). Since a QoS interconnection market does not exist, empirical validation with historic data is currently 
impossible. This implies that the model must be validated based on scenarios created by experts. Our modeling assumptions 
are therefore derived from industry databases and published expert opinions. Furthermore, agents should be subject to real-
world grounded taxonomic classification (LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008). Thus, we assign agent properties from publicly 
available databases which comprise information about the network operators of today’s interconnection market. PeeringDB 
(2010) is an Internet-based database which contains network operator information for the initiation of interconnection 
agreements. This database provides information about peering locations, traffic levels and traffic ratios. CAIDA (2010) is a 
data-record which contains interconnection agreements between network operators in the Best-Effort Internet and enables 
network type classification. This data is particularly suited for the analysis of customer-provider transit relationships 
(Dimitropoulos, Krioukov, Fomenkov, Huffaker, Hyun, Claffy and Riley, 2007). Based on a third data source we infer transit 
prices and a quality premium for QoS-transit (TeleGeography, 2010a, 2010b).  
Agent model 
Network operators differ in their network operator class, geographical presence, interconnection strategy and their traffic 
ratio. These characteristics will be described in detail below. 
Network operator classification 
In the current Internet network operators can be subdivided into four network classes which differ in terms of their business 
objectives and interconnection strategies: large transit provider (LTPs), small transit providers (STPs), content provider (CPs) 
and enterprise customers (ECs) (Dhamdhere and Dovrolis, 2008; Norton, 2003). LTPs have many transit customers and 
possess a global backbone network. STPs are customers of LTPs as they have a limited geographic scope and provide service 
to CPs and ECs. CPs provide Internet services and content to other networks. ECs are companies which provide internet 
access to end-customers. Based on industry database information networks are assigned to network classes. Networks 
without transit customers are classified as CPs, if they offer more data than they request. All other networks without transit 
customers are classified as ECs. Networks which have at least one transit customer are classified as STPs, if more than 10% 
of the purchased and sold transit are purchased. Other networks with transit customers are classified as LTPs. 
Geographical Presence 
In or model we assume that only those networks negotiate about Inter-Provider QoS which are jointly present in one or more 
cities of today’s Internet. We argue that the similarity of two networks increases with the number of cities where both 
networks are present. The degree of similarity of a network j to a network i is quantified with the directed SimilarityIndex: 
 
Limbach et al. Revenue distribution in a quality-centric internet interconnection market 
Proceedings of the Seventeenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Detroit, Michigan August 4th-7th 2011 3 
SimilarityIndexij =
i
ij
A
G
 
 
iA  denotes the overall number of cities were network i is present. ijG denotes the number of cities were a network i and a 
network j have common peering points. 
 
Interconnection strategies 
A key strategic objective of LTPs and STPs is the maximization of the realized transport data volume (Dhamdhere and 
Dovrolis, 2008; Norton, 2002). Thus, transit providers will try to increase their scope with the number of directly and 
indirectly connected CPs and ECs. In the SPP regime data transmitters pay for the termination of content. Since ECs are 
primarily receiving traffic they will increase their scope just like transit providers in order to satisfy their customer’s QoS 
demand. Under the SPP regime CPs are faced with a tradeoff. On the one hand they must ensure that they can satisfy the 
demand for QoS content on the other hand CPs must try to minimize content termination costs. We assume that CPs will 
switch from a scope to a cost minimization strategy once a critical QoS market saturation degree is reached. Based on 
information about broadband penetration in the USA and Germany, which provides a benchmark for the percentage of 
economically reachable consumers, a threshold of 66% will be used for the model (OECD, 2010). 
 
Agent interaction 
In order to simulate QoS interconnection negotiations we use the following procedure. If an agent is in turn of establishing an 
interconnection, it creates a ranked list of the preferred interconnection partners. The order of the ranked list is determined by 
the network specific interconnection strategy and the expected costs and revenues which are calculated based on traffic 
supply and demand. An interconnection will only be established if it is congruent with the interconnection strategy of both 
networks. That is, every established interconnection either increases a network’s scope or reduces the data transport costs. An 
imminent premise of the SPP regime is the assumption that network operators receive sufficient compensation for the use of 
their infrastructure. Thus, de-peering will not be considered as a strategy which can improve a network’s market share and 
will not be part of the model. 
 
Data demand and supply 
Interconnections enable traffic streams that generate revenues for network operators. We are therefore modeling the data 
demand and supply of a network and subsequently derive the revenues. In a first step we determine a network’s data demand 
(Ii): 
 
Ii = TrafficLeveli*On-Net-TrafficRatei*TerminationRatei 
 
The parameters TrafficLevel and TerminationRate are derived from traffic level and traffic ratio information available at 
PeeringDB (2010). We quantify the parameter TerminationRate as follows: Heavy outbound = 0.9; Mostly outbound=0.7; 
Balanced= 0.5; Mostly inbound = 0.3; Heavy inbound = 0.1. Based on information from Renesys (2010) we set the On-Net-
TrafficRate of LTPs to 30% and assume 50% for STPs. ECs and CPs have an On-Net-TrafficRate of 100% as these networks 
do not offer transit. Following Chang, Jamin, Mao and Willinger (2005) we model the data that is requested from CPs as a 
Zipf-distribution. For this purpose we assume that a network operator’s data demand increases with the similarity of its data 
sink network i to the source network j (SimilarityIndexij). Furthermore, we define that OriginationRate and TerminationRate 
add up to 1. These premises enable the data popularity calculation for network i (pij): 
 
pij = TrafficLevelj * On-Net-TrafficRatej *OriginationRatej*SimilarityIndexij 
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Based on an ordered list of all data source popularities pij a rank rij is being assigned to each traffic data source. That is, the 
network operator with the highest data popularity will be assigned to rank one and so on. As proposed by Chang et al. (2005) 
and Dhamdhere and Dovrolis (2009), we determine the traffic stream of the traffic source j to the traffic sink i with the Zipf 
distribution: 
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In the next step a network operator’s data supply Ci can be determined:  
 
∑=
j
iji TC
 
 
Based on the information on data demand and supply and on the existing interconnection in the next step, the traffic flows are 
calculated. For this purpose the data is routed through various interconnections from the source to the sink, based on a routing 
model of Gao and Wang (2002). In the next step, we calculate the costs and revenues based on the transferred data volume 
(v) with the cost function Ki(v) formula: 
 
Ki(v)=v0.857*mi 
 
mi denotes a company specific price component which was determined to be $23.28 with a variance of $2.9. The cost 
function is the result of a non-linear regression which was carried out on DECIX transit prices in Frankfurt, Germany which 
are available in a transit price database (TeleGeography, 2010a). The scaling effect and the price component were confirmed 
with a coefficient of determination of R2=0.989. Furthermore, we assume a 20% markup for QoS traffic as an analysis of 
different VPN classes showed a markup of 19.9% between the cheapest and the most expensive offer (TeleGeography, 
2010b). 
 
Market model 
The establishment of network interconnections is implemented as an iterative procedure. In the first step of each period the 
data demand and suppy is calculated for each agent. In the next step a random agent interaction order is assigned by the 
market. Every agent will approximatly be selected once per period. If an agent is in turn of negotiating with other agents it 
will establish an interconnection according to the procedure which is described in the agent model. Each period ends with the 
calculation of a routing schedule which is determined based on the updated network topology. Finally, the revenues and costs 
are calculated for each agent based on the transported traffic. 
MARKET SIMULATION ANALYSES 
The model described above was implemented using the Java-based development and simulation environment Repast in 
version 1.2.0 (Repast Simphony, 2010). The simulation implementation, setup and results are presented in this section. 
Simulation setup and realization 
The basis for the simulation setup is a representative selection of agents from the PeeringDB (2010), which consecutively 
will be referred to as test case and was created on the basis of PeeringDB and CAIDA data analyses (CAIDA, 2010; 
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PeeringDB, 2010). Analyses show that network operators are very heterogeneous with respect to properties such as traffic 
level, traffic ratio, degree of cross-linking and similarity. Furthermore, computation costs limit the size of a random test case 
sample. Therefore, estimates which would be derived from a random selection of agents can be subject to large fluctuations. 
We address this fact with a stratified sample which reduces the variance of the analyzed network properties within the strata 
and subsequently allows a more precise estimation (Raj, 1968). The test cases sample size and the number of simulations 
were chosen based on considerations of computational complexity. Following LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008) we argue that a 
small-scaled agent model can be well suited to facilitate the understanding of macroeconomic questions. Thus, under the 
same conditions seven simulation runs were accomplished for a set of 22 agents. Thereafter, the simulation results undergo 
statistical analysis.  
Market share analysis 
The aim of the market share analysis is to assess the distribution of the total market revenues among network operator 
classes. For the determination of a period’s market share we are dividing the total revenue of a network operator class by the 
aggregated revenue of all network classes. Subsequently the average of all simulation runs is calculated and shown in Figure 
1. In addition, the average transport costs per unit of data and period are determined for each simulation run. Figure 1 shows 
the change of the average transport costs compared to the previous period.  
 
 
Figure 1. Average revenue shares of network operator classes 
 
According to product life cycle theory the development of the market for QoS data transport can be divided into the 
introduction, growth and saturation phases (Hooley, 1995). In the introduction phase, the first interconnections are 
established. It is characterized by a strong growth of consumer demand saturation degree. In contrast to the introduction 
phase, some CPs already behave price-sensitively in the growth phase. At the end of the growth phase a complete demand 
saturation is reached. In the saturation phase, all CPs try to reduce their transport costs. The saturation phase is completed if 
no further interconnections can be established. A potential degeneration phase is not considered in this analysis because of 
the limited analysis time frame and the assumption of a steadily growing demand for QoS. All three market phases are 
characterized by a clear dominance of the ECs (Figure 1). The market share of ECs and CPs decreases in the introduction 
phase until the end of the introduction phase, whereas in particular the market share of LTPs increases strongly. To achieve a 
high level of demand saturation, CPs are willing to accept high costs for data transport at this phase. This can be observed in 
the curve of the average transport costs per unit of data. The growth phase is characterized by an increase in market share of 
ECs, and a decrease in the shares of STPs and particularly of LTPs. CPs behave cost-sensitive in covering the remaining 
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unsatisfied demand. ECs benefit disproportionately high from the new transportation revenues which are generated by the 
increasing saturation of consumer demand. Furthermore, the cost sensitivity of CPs leads to a reduction in average transport 
costs. In the saturation phase, a slight decline in the average transport cost can be observed. While the market share of ECs 
further increases, the shares of STPs drops. CPs show a relatively steady market share in all market phases.  
Analysis of market power determinants 
In the next step, the market share distribution of LTPs and STPs is to be explored. For this part of the analysis a characteristic 
period is selected for every market phase and the influence of specific network characteristics on the market share is 
quantified. The assessed characteristics include the volume of data supply (C), the volume of data demand (I), the company-
specific price component (mi), the market's random allocation order of the first decision (1stDec), the number of potential 
interconnection partners (#Part) and the number of pre-existing network interconnections (# Con). The influence of the 
network characteristics on the market share is examined by using linear regression analyses. In these regression analyses the 
specific network characteristic represents the independent and the period-revenue of network operators the dependent 
variable. Non-linear relationships were assessed as well, but did not reveal new findings. 
 
      Market share (TP) Beta           
  Pa) Period Avg Max SD C I m 1stDec #Con #Part 
S 1 P1 2 0.10 0.32 0.12 0.647 0.563 -0.067 -0.853* 0.062 0.519 
  P2 18 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.188 0.972** 0.099 -0.486 0.714 0.649 
  P3 22 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.132 0.978** 0.122 -0.433 0.636 0.636 
S 2 P1 3 0.09 0.47 0.19 0.465 0.343 0.820* -0.596 0.948** 0.315 
  P2 9 0.05 0.11 0.04 -0.112 -0.001 0.750 0.162 0.714 -0.155 
  P3 26 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.407 0.609 0.709 -0.669 0.458 0.458 
S 3 P1 3 0.07 0.15 0.06 -0.547 0.406 0.071 0.323 0.712 -0.321 
  P2 17 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.635 0.629 0.657 0.639 0.676 0.561 
  P3 22 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.507 0.658 0.706 0.658 0.530 0.530 
S 4 P1 3 0.09 0.24 0.10 -0.030 0.880* 0.285 0.113 0.919** 0.642 
  P2 5 0.07 0.16 0.06 0.131 0.820* 0.078 -0.064 0.968** 0.749 
  P3 28 0.05 0.18 0.07 -0.097 0.887* 0.730 0.391 0.405 0.405 
S 5 P1 2 0.09 0.23 0.12 -0.561 0.327 0.018 0.047 0.701 -0.496 
  P2 4 0.07 0.26 0.10 -0.113 0.919** -0.584 -0.394 0.907* 0.426 
  P3 25 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.306 0.881* -0.197 -0.150 0.730 0.730 
S 6 P1 2 0.09 0.32 0.14 0.354 0.782 -0.261 -0.052 0.948** 0.452 
  P2 5 0.08 0.24 0.09 0.630 0.498 -0.143 -0.476 0.775 0.510 
  P3 23 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.086 0.941** 0.221 -0.418 0.687 0.687 
S 7 P1 2 0.11 0.52 0.20 -0.127 -0.138 -0.773 -0.272 0.985** 0.356 
  P2 4 0.12 0.36 0.13 -0.338 -0.033 -0.690 -0.547 0.961** 0.192 
  P3 20 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.063 0.967** 0.516 0.472 0.669 0.669 
a) P1: Introduction phase, P2: Growth phase, P3: Saturation phase   
* significant [Level of significance α = 5%]      
** very significant [Level of significance α = 1%]     
Table 1. Market share values and standardized regression coefficients 
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Table 1 presents standardized regression coefficients (Beta) for the seven simulation runs (S1-7). For each analyzed period 
and each simulation run the average (Avg), standard deviation (SD) and maximum (Max) of the market share is calculated. 
For the analysis of the introduction phase we select the characteristic period, in which CPs change their strategy and the 
consumer demand saturation degree is closest to 66%. Similarly the growth phase shall be characterized by the period in 
which the market reaches the complete saturation of consumer demand for the first time. For the analysis of the saturation 
phase we select the first period that is characterized by the fact that no further interconnections can be established. 
INTERPRETATION 
The market share analysis indicates that STPs and particularly LTPs act as procurer for data transport during the introduction 
phase. They transport high traffic volumes and thus increase their market share. However, the market share of LTPs 
decreases rapidly during growth phase. This finding suggests a disintermediation in the data transport chain: in order to 
ensure a cost-effective transport, more direct links are established and LTPs are bypassed. As indicated by the cost change 
curve, CPs realize the strongest transport cost savings in this step. The decreasing market share of STPs suggests a trend 
towards the establishment of direct connections during growth phase. A similar development can be observed in the Best-
Effort internet, where interconnections are increasingly established at lower hierarchical levels in order to bypass Tier 1 
network operators (McPherson, 2009). 
The regression analysis provides an insight into the determinants of market success. During introduction phase the number of 
existing interconnections is the most important success factor for transit providers. Other determinants hardly influence the 
market share in this phase. A high maximum market share and a large market share distribution have been observed. These 
observations indicate the occurrence of network effects during the introduction phase. At an interconnection market network 
effects increase the benefit that a network operator gains from an interconnection with a partner along with the number of 
interconnections which this partner has already established (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). In network effect markets positive 
feedback can lead to a strong dominance of a market actor. Thus, the existing interconnections of a network operator can be 
considered a core resource for the development of further interconnections and an increase in market share. During growth 
phase, the number of existing interconnections remains the most significant determinant for explaining the market share. 
Furthermore, a decreasing variance of market shares and smaller maximum market shares can be observed. This suggests a 
decreasing importance of network effects. At the same time the volume of data demand gains importance. During saturation 
phase network effects can no longer be observed. In this phase the only significant determinant is the volume of data demand.  
The company-specific price component does not influence interconnection revenues. This result can be traced back to the fact 
that the proposed model is based on the SPP regime. In this regime the establishment of a direct connections between source 
and sink network always has a cost minimizing effect. Consequently a disintermediation of LTPs and STPs occurs for any 
QoS transit price. The lack of correlation between the amount of possible interconnection partners and revenues implies that 
presence at interconnection points does not constitute a competitive advantage. However, our model does not consider this 
aspect to the full extent as local competitive differentiation is not part of our research. The analysis also does not reveal first 
mover advantages because the random agent interaction order has no significant effect on the market success. However, the 
observed time differences of the active market entry are small. An analysis of greater time periods could result in different 
conclusions at least for the introduction and growth phase. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to facilitate the development of future content provider business models, which require Inter-Provider QoS, network 
operators are discussing the introduction of a SPP interconnection regime. By analyzing the economic consequences of 
competitive strategic behavior under the SSP regime we aim to contribute to the consolidation of a controversial debate 
between advocates and opponents of a QoS interconnection market. For this purpose we conduct a market analysis for a set 
of 22 network operators in order to assess a scenario for revenue distribution in a SPP interconnection market. The results of 
our analyses indicate that content providers have incentives to bypass transit providers and establish direct interconnections 
with access providers. A similar trend can be observed in today’s internet where paid-peering is becoming common between 
content and access providers (Faratin et al., 2007). According to the simulation results access providers collect a large share 
of the overall market revenues. Therefore, our results support the argumentation in Kruse (2008) that an SPP regime offers 
incentives to invest in an infrastructure that meets higher quality requirements. Thus, content provider business models which 
require Inter-Provider QoS would be facilitated by the new interconnection regime.  
 
The proposed model has several limitations. Thus, caution is advised in generalizing the results. The current version of the 
model considers only two interconnection strategies that are assigned to network operators of discrete network classes. In a 
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real QoS interconnection market more differentiated strategies may consider decision parameters that are currently not part of 
the model. Due to the high computational complexity simulations were carried out with a limited number of network 
operators and simulation runs. Thus, a set of agents with properties which differ from the representative test case might not 
reproduce the observed results. Further research efforts will focus on improving the model’s ability to produce results which 
are valid beyond the scope of a representative test case. 
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